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MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO RISK IN THE CANADIAN 
LAW OF TOXIC TORTS
LYNDA M. COLLINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Common law approaches to causation have historically been based on 
the premise that if a defendant’s negligence has caused a plaintiff’s loss, 
she will probably be able to prove it.1 This assumption is untenable in our 
contemporary world of immense chemical complexity.2 In the toxic torts 
context,3 traditional approaches to causation have resulted in under-
compensation of injured victims and under-deterrence of chemical wrong-
doing.4 Indeed, writing extra-judicially in the late 1990s, the current Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “[t]he all-or-nothing 
outcome of the [traditional] test [for causation] all too often results in a 
‘nothing,’ inconsistent with modern expectations.”5 Jurists and scholars 
have sought to soften the rigidity of the causation element by importing 
risk-based innovations into the causation analysis. This Article will intro-
duce and analyze one such innovation: the test of “material contribution to 
risk” in the Canadian law of toxic torts.6
Part II considers the unique challenges that arise in the causation anal-
ysis in toxic torts, with a particular focus on the problem of scientific un-
certainty. Part III elucidates the stages of the causation inquiry in Canadian 
* Professor, Centre for Environmental Law & Global Sustainability, University of Ottawa, Fac-
ulty of Law.
1. Lynda Collins, Material Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts, 11 J. ENVTL. L. &
PRAC. 106, 106 (2001); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public 
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 858 (1984).
2. CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 12 (2006).
3. Toxic torts can be defined as torts arising from environmental contamination or a toxic prod-
uct. LYNDA COLLINS & HEATHER MCLEOD-KILMURRAY, THE CANADIAN LAW OF TOXIC TORTS 1
(2014).
4. See id.; see also Lynda Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Material Contribution to 
Justice? Toxic Causation after Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 411 (2010).
5. The Honorable Beverly M. McLachlin, Negligence Law - Proving the Connection, in TORTS 
TOMORROW: A TRIBUTE TO JOHN FLEMING 34 (Nicholas J. Mullany & Allen M. Linden eds., 1998).
6. For a more detailed analysis of the Canadian law of toxic causation, see COLLINS & MCLEOD-
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toxic tort law, including consideration of the standard of proof, the but-for 
test, and the new test of material contribution to risk. Part IV introduces 
proposals for risk-based reform in Canadian causation law, and Part V pre-
sents a brief conclusion. In order to do justice to toxic tort plaintiffs, and 
remain relevant in the twenty-first century, Canadian tort law needs to 
grapple with the new world of chemically-induced harm by adopting a 
broad test of material contribution to risk, complemented by stronger forms 
of risk-based liability.
II. CAUSATION IN THE CHEMICAL WORLD
A. Scientific Uncertainty
In the decades since the ‘chemical revolution’ of the mid-twentieth 
century, thousands of synthetic chemicals and millions of chemical mix-
tures have entered the human environment.7 While some chemicals are 
harmless, others have caused untold human suffering. Toxic pollution and 
products cause tens of thousands of premature deaths each year in North 
America.8 In the middle ground between known innocuous and proven 
toxic substances is a vast grey area of profound and pervasive scientific 
uncertainty.9 Surprisingly, for many thousands of chemicals and millions of 
mixtures, rigorous toxicity data is simply lacking.10 The generation of 
chemical safety data has been frustrated by both legal and scientific factors. 
On the scientific side, the challenges are manifold. Environmental pollu-
7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON TOXICITY TESTING & ASSESSMENT OF ENVTL.
AGENTS, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY 40 (2007); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING FOR ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS 99 (2006); 
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRINT 16 (First Mariner Books 2002) (1962) (noting that “[f]or the first time 
in the history of the world, every human being is now subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals, 
from the moment of conception until death”).
8. See, e.g., DAVID R. BOYD, CLEANER, GREENER, HEALTHIER: A PRESCRIPTION FOR 
STRONGER CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND POLICIES (2015); JOE THORNTON, PANDORA’S
POISON: CHLORINE, HEALTH, AND A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY (2000); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
COUNTRY PROFILE OF ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN OF DISEASE: CANADA (2009) (estimating that envi-
ronmental hazards cause or contribute to 36, 800 premature deaths in Canada each year).
9. See generally Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal Vision of 
Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013); Richard Goldberg, 
Epidemiological Uncertainty, Causation, and Drug Product Liability, 59 MCGILL L. J. 777 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its Critics, 2011 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2011) (“[W]e lack basic toxicity data for the vast majority of chemicals 
used in cookware, toys, beauty products, food packaging, and other items.”); see CHRISTIAN HEIDORN,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE REACH BASELINE STUDY—A TOOL TO MONITOR THE NEW EU POLICY ON 
CHEMICALS 3 (2009) (noting “our very limited knowledge about the properties of substances and their 
safe uses”); CRANOR, supra note 2, at 12 (“[I]n general, the probability is that for any given substance 
little is likely to be known about it.”); D. ROE ET AL., ENVTL. DEF. FUND, TOXIC IGNORANCE: THE 
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tants are difficult to trace once released and interact in complex and poorly 
understood ways with each other, environmental media and human bod-
ies.11 Non-pharmaceutical chemicals cannot be tested directly on humans, 
leaving only animal testing, which is costly, time-consuming and ethically 
controversial.12 Thousands of new substances are invented every year and 
yet neither government nor academia has the capacity (in personnel, money 
or test animals) to subject this number of substances to thorough independ-
ent study.13 To summarize, our ability to invent and disseminate new chem-
ical substances has far outpaced our ability to understand them.
On the legal side, outdated processes in both statutory environmental 
law and torts have strongly incentivized chemical producers to “choose 
ignorance” in order to limit liability.14 Statutory environmental law has
presumed chemicals innocent until proven guilty, treating the absence of 
evidence of harm as evidence of an absence of harm, a fallacy that is 
soundly rejected by scientists.15 In a statutory system that requires data in 
order to justify regulatory limits, the rational manufacturer tends to under-
study its products in order to limit the risk of adverse results.16 Tort law has 
similarly required the injured plaintiff to present evidence proving on a 
balance of probabilities that the defendant’s substance caused her illness, 
even where the data to support or refute such a claim are unavailable. Carl 
Cranor summarizes the legal drivers of chemical uncertainty as follows:
Because the regulation of suspect substances that enter the market with-
out legally required testing will occur only if a governmental agency 
[shows] a risk of harm and a tort action will proceed only if a plaintiff 
shows [causation of] actual harm, firms have incentives to resist testing 
their products and monitoring them for adverse effects and often they 
have not.17
Against this backdrop of massive (and sometimes intentional) chemi-
cal uncertainty, toxic tort plaintiffs have continued to bear the burden of 
11. THORNTON, supra note 8, at 414.
12. See CRANOR, supra note 2, at 105–11.
13. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997); Sachs, supra note 10.
14. Wagner, supra note 13.
15. Id.; D.G. Altman & J.M. Bland, Absence of Evidence is Not Evidence of Absence, 19 BRIT.
MED. J. 311, 485 (1995); David Kreibel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science,
109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 873 (2001).
16. CRANOR, supra note 2, at 13; Wagner, supra note 13, at 774–75.
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proving causation, largely by reference to legal tests that long pre-date our 
current chemical reality.
Despite compelling scholarly calls for reform,18 causation remains a 
touchstone for tort liability in Canada. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Cana-
da has described causation as “an expression of the relationship that must 
be found to exist between the tortious act of the wrongdoer and the injury 
to the victim in order to justify compensation of the latter out of the pocket 
of the former.”19 Causation is an element of the negligence cause of action, 
without which there can be no recovery.20 Even with respect to torts that 
are actionable without proof of injury (e.g., battery), the plaintiff must 
prove a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and her injury in order 
to recover compensatory damages.21 A voluminous body of scholarship has 
attempted to resolve the dilemma of toxic causation,22 but causation re-
mains the single biggest hurdle to recovery for the toxic tort plaintiff in 
Canada as elsewhere.23
B. Legal Uncertainty in Toxic Causation
In toxic tort cases, the causation element can be broken down into two 
components: generic causation and specific causation.24 Generic causation 
refers to the capacity of the substance at issue to cause the kind of injury 
suffered by the plaintiff. It concerns the general characteristics of the sub-
stance, such as whether it has been shown in lab tests to cause a particular 
illness in test animals, or whether there is epidemiological evidence sug-
gesting a substance-illness connection in human populations.25 If there is 
18. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory 
of Justice and Toxic Tort, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); see Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for 
Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 221, 234 (Richard S. Goldberg ed., 2010).
19. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326 (Can.).
20. Id.
21. See Lynda M. Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Toxic Battery: A Tort of Our Time?, 16 
TORT L. REV. 131, 147 (2008). 
22. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1; Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 4; Gold, supra note 
9; Brenda Heelan Powell, Cause for Concern: An Overview of Approaches to the Causation Problem in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 227 (1999); Per Laleng, Causal Responsibility for Uncer-
tainty and Risk in Toxic Torts, 18 TORT L. REV. 102 (2010); Wagner, supra note 13; see generally
Berger, supra note 18.
23. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 148 (1995). 
24. See Lynda M. Collins, Material Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts, 11 J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 106, 109 (2001) [hereinafter Collins, Material Contribution] (citing JEAN 
MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, TOXIC TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 197 (1995); see also Vern R. Walker, Restoring 
the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting ‘Junk Logic’ About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 381, 383 (2004).
25. Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 4, at 419; CRANOR, supra note 2, at 91 (chapter 4:
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insufficient evidence that the defendant’s substance is capable of causing 
the plaintiff’s illness under any circumstances, then the causation inquiry is 
at an end. If, however, the plaintiff can prove generic causation, she must 
nonetheless show that the defendant’s toxic substance actually caused her
illness in the specific circumstances of her case. To assess specific causa-
tion, courts will consider factors such as the nature, duration and concentra-
tion of the plaintiff’s exposure as well as other risk factors that might 
account for the plaintiff’s illness.26
Proof of both generic and specific causation frequently founders on 
the problem of scientific uncertainty discussed above (and thoroughly can-
vassed in the literature of toxic torts).27 In addition to the massive uncer-
tainty surrounding the safety (or danger) of chemical substances,28 the 
illnesses at issue in many toxic tort actions are both multi-factorial and 
poorly understood,29 and the injurious encounter takes place at least partly 
on a microscopic level invisible to the naked eye.30 This constellation of 
factors has produced three discernible kinds of uncertainty in torts cases.
The first scenario involving the indeterminate plaintiff arises when a 
defendant increases the incidence of an illness that already occurs at back-
ground levels in a given population.31 Through epidemiological evidence, 
we know that the defendant has harmed some individuals within an ex-
posed group, but there exists no individual plaintiff who can prove causa-
tion against the defendant. S.M. Waddams postulates the following 
hypothetical:
The defendant pollutes the air and increases the risk to the whole popula-
tion of Australia of contracting skin cancer, raising the risk, let us say, 
from 10 per 100,000 to 19 per 100,000. On these figures, no particular 
plaintiff with cancer can show that the defendant probably caused the 
disease: more probably than not the plaintiff would have contracted it in 
26. See Michael R. Hadskis, Finding Our Way Out of the Causation Jungle in Toxic Torts at 117-
18 (Sept. 1993) (unpublished thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School) (on file with the National Library of 
Canada). 
27. See, e.g., COLLINS & MCLEOD-KILMURRAY, supra note 3, at 9–37.  
28. Id.; See also Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Pat-
terns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 6 (2001) (“In general, little is known about the universe of approximately 100,000 chemical 
substances or their derivatives registered for commerce (with 800 to 1000 new substances added to the 
list each year).”).
29. See generally PHIL BROWN, TOXIC EXPOSURES: CONTESTED ILLNESSES AND THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT (2007).
30. See Hadskis, supra note 26, at 3; Gold, supra note 9, at 244.
31. See generally Shelly Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 72 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
07 COLLINS-FINAL REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:08 PM
572 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
any case. Should the defendant be liable? If so, should the plaintiff re-
cover full compensation, or only 9/19ths of it?32
Population-based evidence is clearly sufficient where it establishes 
that more than 50% of the plaintiff’s total risk factors emanate from the 
defendant’s substance.33 However, questions arise where risk does not meet 
this threshold, as in the Waddams example above. In Canada, causation is a 
qualitative, logical and common sense inquiry rather than a mechanistic,
scientific calculation; taking a “robust and pragmatic” common sense ap-
proach as instructed by the Supreme Court of Canada,34 proof of significant 
risk will often be sufficient to meet the but-for test in the absence of a con-
vincing alternative explanation. Some claims in this category will fail due 
to scientific uncertainty, but in Clements v. Clements, the Supreme Court of 
Canada explicitly left open the possibility of causation reform in the inde-
terminate plaintiff scenario in a future case.35
The second species of uncertainty identified in the toxic tort literature 
is that of indeterminate harm, or mere risk exposure.36 People who are ex-
posed to toxic substances sometimes require medical monitoring, experi-
ence anxiety, or feel victimized by the defendant’s conduct even if they 
have not yet contracted a disease (and might never do so).37 Canadian 
courts have thus far declined to answer repeated academic calls for the 
creation of a new tort of negligent creation of risk.38 There is currently no 
cause of action in Canada for the negligent infliction of risk alone, but the 
injury requirement may be met by psychiatric illness or relatively minor 
physical harm.39 Although there is no Supreme Court of Canada authority 
on point, a number of lower courts have also certified class actions for 
32. S.M. Waddams, Causation in Canada and Australia, 2 TORT L. REV. 75, 77 (1993).
33. Note, however, that proof of a doubling of risk should not be required. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (“Any 
judicial requirement that plaintiffs must show a threshold increase in risk or a doubling in incidence in a 
group study in order to satisfy the burden of proof of specific causation is usually inappropriate.”).
34. See Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 323–30 (Can.); Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 
S.C.R. 181, para. 59 (Can.).
35. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 44 (Can.).
36. See JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, TOXIC TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 332, 348–56 (4th ed. 2010).
37. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
38. See, e.g., David Gerecke, Risk Exposure as Injury: Alleviating the Injustice of Tort Causation 
Rules, 35 MCGILL L. REV. 797 (1990); Porat & Stein, supra note 18.
39. See Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd., [1997] O.J. No. 3304 (Can. Ont. 
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medical monitoring.40 Thus, there is some hope for Canadian plaintiffs in 
the indeterminate harm scenario.
The final species of uncertainty in toxic torts—and perhaps the most 
notorious—is that of defendant indeterminacy. In the indeterminate de-
fendant scenario, a plaintiff can show that the particular substance at issue 
caused her illness, but it is impossible to determine which defendant is 
responsible for her exposure.41 Such cases occur where multiple defendants 
manufacture an identical defective drug42 or emit a hazardous pollutant that 
comingles with other identical discharges.43 In the indeterminate defendant 
scenario, the plaintiff can prove all elements of negligence except causa-
tion; she can demonstrate that each defendant breached a duty owed to her 
and that she sustained a proximate loss.44 Moreover, the plaintiff can show 
that the negligence of one or more in a group of identifiable defendants 
(e.g., a group of manufacturers of a particular drug) actually caused her 
illness. However, if she cannot point to the particular defendant or defend-
ants responsible for her illness, then causation is not made out and, on a 
traditional analysis, she recovers nothing.
Courts in the United States have addressed the indeterminate defend-
ant scenario in a wide variety of ways, from simple dismissal of plaintiffs’ 
claims to the development of new forms of collective liability—most fa-
mously the doctrine of market share liability.45 As elaborated below, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has gone further, imposing joint and several 
liability on all defendants in the indeterminate defendant scenario.46
These three varieties of uncertainty pose challenges at various stages 
of the causation inquiry in toxic torts.47 They complicate the court’s as-
sessment of evidence and drive choice-of-instrument decisions in the doc-
trinal analysis of causation.
40. See generally Brandon Stewart, Just What the Doctor Ordered: A Canadian Approach to 
Medical Monitoring and Toxic Risk, 8 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 271, 293–95 (2013).
41. See Collins, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
42. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (1980); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxa-
tion of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982).
43. See generally In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 
2d 348, 377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Emily H. Damron, Reviving the Market for Liability Theories: The 
“Commingled Product” Theory of Market Share Liability Enters the Judicial Lexicon, 111 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 505 (2006).
44. See EGGEN, supra note 36, at 216.
45. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market 
Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006); Christopher J. McGuire, Market-Share Liability After 
Hymowitz and Conley: Exploring the Limits of Judicial Power, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 759 (1991).
46. See generally Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181 (Can.).
47. See generally ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Oxford 
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III. CANADIAN APPROACHES TO THE CAUSATION PROBLEM IN TOXIC 
TORTS
A. Standard of Proof
As in the United States, the standard of proof in Canadian tort actions 
is the balance of probabilities (also known as the preponderance of the 
evidence).48 Although there is no doctrinal controversy on this point, judg-
es in toxic tort actions run the risk of inadvertently adopting the scientific 
standard of proof as they receive and evaluate voluminous amounts of ex-
pert evidence from scientific witnesses. Unlike judges, pure research scien-
tists operate on a limitless timeline and in a culture that places enormous 
value on causal skepticism.49 Since scientists do not consider a causal link 
to be established unless it is proven to a probability of 95% or greater, the 
importation of scientific standards of proof into torts cases is a serious er-
ror.50 In Palmer v. Nova Scotia Forest Industries, for example, the provin-
cial court refused an application for an injunction against the spraying of a 
pesticide containing dioxin on the basis that there was “no scientifically 
acceptable proof of risk to health.”51 The appropriate question—whether 
there was legally acceptable proof of risk—was never answered. In con-
trast, the court in Ring v. The Queen52 noted that while the representative 
plaintiff’s proposed approach to proof of causation might not “‘lead to a 
meaningful scientific answer with respect to a specific dose-response rela-
tionship,’ it may lead to a meaningful legal answer regarding the creation 
of unreasonable risks for the general public.”53
Any amount of uncertainty may prevent a research scientist from con-
cluding that substance X causes illness Y,54 but a civil court can make a 
finding of causation even in the presence of substantial doubt. In Snell v. 
48. See Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 323–30 (Can.).
49. See CRANOR, supra note 2, at 162, 182–85, 215. 
50. See generally John M. Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be 
Reconciled?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 369 (2001); Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in 
Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985 (2007-2008); Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Placing and Displacing Sci-
ence, 6 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 25, 29–32 (2009); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Demys-
tifying the Law/Science Disconnect, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 429 (2001).
51. Palmer v. Nova Scotia Forest Industries, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 397, para. 581 (N.S. T.D.) (1983).
52. Ring v. The Queen, 2007 CanLII 146 (Can. Nfld. & P.E.I.R.).
53. Id. at para. 151. Certification was reversed on appeal on the grounds (inter alia) that causation 
was not a common issue among class members, but the trial judge’s distinction between scientific and 
legal causation was not disturbed. 
54. See Hans-Olov Adami et al., Toxicology and Epidemiology: Improving the Science with a 
Framework for Combining Toxicological and Epidemiological Evidence to Establish Causal Inference,
122 TOXICOLGICAL SCI. 223, 224 (2011) (“Indeed, a principle underlying the philosophy of science is 
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Farrell, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that apparent injustices 
resulting from the but-for test arose from rigidity in its application,55 and 
confirmed that causation need not be proved to a level of scientific preci-
sion.56 More recently, Chief Justice McLachlin in Clements reiterated that 
“[t]he ‘but for’ causation test must be applied in a robust common sense 
fashion. There is no need for scientific evidence of the precise contribution 
the defendant’s negligence made to the injury.”57 In other words, Canadian 
torts jurists need not search for the transcendent scientific “truth”; they are 
merely tasked with deciding whether a causal link is more likely than not.
Having adopted the appropriate standard of proof, courts adjudicating 
toxic tort actions in Canada are faced with a range of distinct approaches to 
the test for factual causation. First and foremost among causal tests in the 
Anglo-Canadian tradition is the but-for (sine qua non) approach.
B. The But-for Test
According to the traditional test for factual causation, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that “but for” (i.e., in the absence of) the defendant’s breach of 
the standard of care, she would not have sustained her loss. Thus, if a toxic 
tort plaintiff can prove a probability of 51% or greater that the defendant’s 
negligence caused her illness or injury, then factual causation is treated as a 
certainty and the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to recover 100% of her 
past losses from the defendant. If the evidence falls short of a 51% proba-
bility of causation, the plaintiff has failed to discharge her burden of proof 
and recovers nothing.58 A rigid application of the but-for test produces 
manifest injustice where the defendant has exposed the plaintiff to an un-
reasonable risk of developing a particular illness that she does in fact con-
tract, but causation is in doubt because of a lack of data concerning the 
substance in question.59 This injustice is particularly pronounced where the 
uncertainty stems from the defendant’s own failure to investigate its sub-
stance. In his masterful book, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility 
of Justice, Cranor explains:
55. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 328 (Can.).
56. Id.
57. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 9 (Can.); see also Emir Crowne & Omar 
Ha-Redeye, Clements v. Clements: A Material Contribution to the Jurisprudence - The Supreme Court 
of Canada Clarifies the Law of Causation, 2 UWO J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2012).
58. In contrast to past losses, once causation of injury is proven on a balance of probabilities 
future losses flowing from that injury are not subject to the all-or-nothing causation analysis. Instead, 
future or hypothetical damages arising from a proven injury are recoverable according to the probability 
that the loss will occur. See Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 470–71 (Can.).
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[Given the] woeful ignorance that plagues much scientific and agency 
knowledge of the universe of chemical substances . . . it is both possible 
and likely that some toxic tort cases are dismissed simply because of ig-
norance about a particular substance and its properties, leaving wrongful-
ly injured plaintiffs without a remedy, and undermining the deterrence 
goal of tort law.60
In many cases, recovery is possible on a but-for standard where courts 
adhere to the legal standard of proof, take a common sense perspective on 
causation, and apply the “robust and pragmatic” approach to evidence 
mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, even when this flex-
ible, contemporary approach to sine qua non is adopted, some meritorious 
plaintiffs will fail as a result of evidentiary gaps that result from a defend-
ant’s intentional choices.
C. Reverse Onus
Given the perverse incentive that exists when manufacturers benefit 
from a lack of data about their own substances, the idea of reversing the 
onus of proof would appear to make good sense in the toxic tort context. 
The House of Lords adopted a reverse onus on causation in the toxic tort 
case of McGhee v. National Coal Board.61 There, the plaintiff employee 
cleaned brick kilns for the defendant employer, resulting in the accumula-
tion of dust on his skin. The defendant negligently failed to provide shower 
facilities for its employees resulting in the plaintiff being forced to bicycle 
home each day covered in layers of dust. The plaintiff subsequently devel-
oped dermatitis and sued the defendant for negligence. At trial, expert tes-
timony established that the defendant’s failure to provide showers 
materially increased the plaintiff’s risk of developing dermatitis, but it was 
scientifically impossible to conclude (on a balance of probabilities) that it 
actually caused the dermatitis.
At the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce developed a new test for 
causation to address this dilemma; he held that “where a person has, by 
breach of a duty of care, created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of 
that risk, the loss should be borne by him unless he shows that it had some 
other cause.”62 A number of lower courts in Canada initially followed 
McGhee, adopting the reverse onus where there was proof of negligent 
60. Cranor & Eastmond, supra note 28, at 46.
61. McGhee v. National Coal Board [1972] UKHL 7.
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creation of risk and injury within the ambit of that risk.63 Material contribu-
tion to risk survives in Canadian case law, but the reversal in burden of 
proof on causation was explicitly rejected in Snell v. Farrell,64 a rejection 
that was later confirmed in Hanke v. Resurfice.
D. The Material Contribution to Risk Test
In Hanke v. Resurfice, the Supreme Court of Canada returned to the 
material contribution to risk approach articulated in McGhee, but retained 
the traditional allocation of burden of proof. The plaintiff in Hanke was
badly burned when he inadvertently placed a water hose into the gas tank 
of an ice-resurfacing machine, causing an explosion and fire. Hanke sued 
the manufacturer of the machine, alleging that the two tanks were designed 
and positioned in such a way that an operator was likely to make such a 
mistake and suffer injury. On the question of causation, Chief Justice 
McLachlin held as follows:
21  First, the basic test for determining causation remains the “but for” 
test. This applies to multi-cause injuries. The plaintiff bears the burden 
of showing that “but for” the negligent act or omission of each defend-
ant, the injury would not have occurred. Having done this, contributory 
negligence may be apportioned, as permitted by statute.
22  This fundamental rule has never been displaced and remains the pri-
mary test for causation in negligence actions. As stated in Athey v. Leo-
nati, at para. 14, per Major J., “[t]he general, but not conclusive, test for 
causation is the ‘but for’ test, which requires the plaintiff to show that the 
injury would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendant.” 
Similarly, as I noted in Blackwater v. Plint, at para. 78, “[t]he rules of 
causation consider generally whether ‘but for’ the defendant’s acts, the 
plaintiff’s damages would have been incurred on a balance of probabili-
ties.”
23  The “but for” test recognizes that compensation for negligent con-
duct should only be made “where a substantial connection between the 
injury and defendant’s conduct” is present. It ensures that a defendant 
will not be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries where they “may very 
well be due to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of 
anyone”: Snell v. Farrell, at p. 327, per Sopinka J.65
63. See, e.g., Wipfli v. Britten (1984), 13 D.L.R. 4th 169 (B.C. C.A.); Powell v. Guttman (No. 2)
(1978), 89 D.L.R. 3d 180 (Man. C.A.); Letnik v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1988), 49 
D.L.R. 4th 707 (F.C.).
64. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326–28 (Can.).
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She went on to articulate an exception to the but-for test that subse-
quently generated a vigorous and contentious debate among advocates and 
legal scholars:66
24  [I]n special circumstances, the law has recognized exceptions to the 
basic “but for” test, and applied a “material contribution” test. Broadly 
speaking, the cases in which the “material contribution” test is properly 
applied involve two requirements.
25  First, it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defend-
ant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury using the “but for” test. The 
impossibility must be due to factors that are outside of the plaintiff’s 
control; for example, current limits of scientific knowledge. Second, it 
must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, 
and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of injury. In other words, 
the plaintiff’s injury must fall within the ambit of the risk created by the 
defendant’s breach. In those exceptional cases where these two require-
ments are satisfied, liability may be imposed, even though the “but for” 
test is not satisfied, because it would offend basic notions of fairness and 
justice to deny liability by applying a “but for” approach.67
Although the phrase “material contribution” is left without object in 
Hanke, in Clements, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly held that the 
test refers to material contribution to risk rather than injury.68 Indeed, Chief 
Justice McLachlin acknowledges that the material contribution test for 
causation is predicated on risk as the conceptual foundation for liability: 
“‘[M]aterial contribution’ as a substitute for the usual requirement of ‘but 
for’ causation . . . imposes liability not because the evidence establishes 
that the defendant’s act caused the injury, but because the act contributed to 
the risk that injury would occur.”69
66. See generally Vaughan Black & David Cheifetz, Through the Looking Glass, Darkly: Re-
surfice Corp. v. Hanke, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 249 (2007); Andrew Botterell & Christopher Essert, Norma-
tivity, Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 663 (2009); Russell 
Brown, The Possibility of ‘Inference Causation’: Inferring Cause-in-fact and the Nature of Legal Fact 
Finding, 55 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2010); David Cheifetz & Vaughan Black, Material Contribution and 
Quantum Uncertainty: Hanke v. Resurfice Corp., 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 155 (2006); Collins & McLeod-
Kilmurray, supra note 4; Lara Khoury, Causation and Health in Medical, Environmental and Product 
Liability, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 135 (2007); Jill Lawrie et al., The Test for Causation in 
Canada: But for, But. . . Maybe Not, 75 DEF. COUNSEL J. 378 (2008).
67. Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, paras. 24–25 (Can.).
68. See Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, paras. 14-16 (Can.); see also Robin Hansen, 
Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd. and the Material-Contribution Test for Factual Causation in 
Negligence, 48 ALTA. L. REV. 771 (2011); Khoury, supra note 66; but see Henry v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 214, para. 98 (Can.).
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The plaintiff in Clements was severely injured when she was thrown 
from a motorcycle being driven by her husband, the defendant. The acci-
dent occurred when the vehicle ran over a nail that punctured the rear tire, 
causing it to rapidly deflate; Mr. Clements lost control of the vehicle and it 
ultimately crashed.70 The trial court found that the defendant negligently 
overloaded the vehicle and operated it at an excessive speed, but was not 
satisfied that the accident would not have occurred but for these factors.71
The court concluded that the material contribution test set out in Hanke 
could be applied since it was scientifically impossible to determine at 
which speed and weight the motorcycle could have been brought under 
control after losing air pressure in the rear wheel.72
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the trial judge imposed lia-
bility on Mr. Clements.73 The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that this 
was not an appropriate case for the application of material contribution.74
Citing an article by Professor Erik Knutsen,75 the Court of Appeal held that 
material contribution may be used only in cases involving either “depend-
ency causation” (the circumstance in which it is impossible to say what a 
third party would have done had the defendant exercised due care) or “cir-
cular causation” (the scenario in which it is clear that one in a group of 
tortfeasors caused the plaintiff’s harm but it is impossible to identify which 
one).76 In contrast, the court held that material contribution could not be 
applied when causal uncertainty results from the fact that the science is 
“just not there yet.”77
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the plaintiff’s appeal in Clem-
ents but adopted a test that appears to be substantially similar to that em-
ployed by the Court of Appeal. After clarifying that the “material 
contribution” test does indeed refer to risk rather than injury, the Court 
articulated the following summary of causation:
(1) As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot succeed unless she shows as a 
matter of fact that she would not have suffered the loss “but for” the neg-
ligent act or acts of the defendant. A trial judge is to take a robust and 
pragmatic approach to determining if a plaintiff has established that the 
70. Id. at para. 1.
71. Id. at paras. 1–3. 
72. Id.
73. Id. at para. 3.
74. Clements v Clements, [2010) 12 B.C.L.R. 5th, para. 64 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
75. Erik S. Knutsen, Clarifying Causation in Tort, 33 DALHOUSIE L.J. 153 (2010).
76. Clements v Clements, [2010) 12 B.C.L.R. 5th, paras. 54–56 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
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defendant’s negligence caused her loss. Scientific proof of causation is 
not required.
(2) Exceptionally, a plaintiff may succeed by showing that the defend-
ant’s conduct materially contributed to risk of the plaintiff’s injury, 
where (a) the plaintiff has established that her loss would not have oc-
curred “but for” the negligence of two or more tortfeasors, each possibly 
in fact responsible for the loss; and (b) the plaintiff, through no fault of 
her own, is unable to show that any one of the possible tortfeasors in fact 
was the necessary or “but for” cause of her injury, because each can 
point to one another as the possible “but for” cause of the injury, defeat-
ing a finding of causation on a balance of probabilities against anyone.78
As it did in Hanke, the Court emphasized that but-for remains the de-
fault test in cases involving multiple defendants:
It is important to reaffirm that in the usual case of multiple agents or ac-
tors, the traditional “but for” test still applies. The question, as discussed 
earlier, is whether the plaintiff has shown that one or more of the defend-
ants’ negligence was a necessary cause of the injury. Degrees of fault are 
reflected in calculations made under contributory negligence legislation. 
By contrast, the material contribution to risk approach applies where 
“but for” causation cannot be proven against any of multiple defendants, 
all negligent in a manner that might have in fact caused the plaintiff’s in-
jury, because each can use a “point the finger” strategy to preclude a 
finding of causation on a balance of probabilities.79
Thus, although the Court rejects the language of “circular causation” 
and “dependency causation,” it has effectively limited material contribution 
to risk (for now) to the former scenario. The narrowing of material contri-
bution in Clements poses a risk that plaintiffs who are negligently injured 
by chemical wrongdoing will be denied recovery as a result of uncertainty 
that is well beyond their control (and indeed, may have been intentional on 
the part of defendants).80 The requirement of multiple tortious causes pre-
cludes recovery in many cases and will produce absurd results in others.
In the famous case of Cook v. Lewis, for example, the Supreme Court 
of Canada imposed joint and several liability on two defendants who negli-
gently shot in the direction of the plaintiff’s face, simultaneously destroy-
ing the plaintiff’s ability to identify which defendant caused the injury.81
78. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 46 (Can.).
79. Id. at para. 43.
80. See Wagner, supra note 13.
81. Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.) (Cook v. Lewis is the Canadian analogue to Sum-
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The Clements approach would inexplicably allow a defendant in the Cook 
scenario to “escape liability if he could show that, while he was negligent, 
the other shooter was not.”82 Despite this anomaly, it does provide a reme-
dy to plaintiffs who are injured by multiple negligent defendants and in this 
sense provides a meaningful response to the problem of the indeterminate 
defendant.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Clements specifically left open the 
question of whether material contribution to risk might also apply in the 
indeterminate plaintiff scenario:
[44] This is not to say that new situations will not raise new considera-
tions. I leave for another day, for example, the scenario that might arise 
in mass toxic tort litigation with multiple plaintiffs, where it is estab-
lished statistically that the defendant’s acts induced an injury on some 
members of the group, but it is impossible to know which ones.83
Thus, although Clements undoubtedly represents a retreat from the 
broader, principled test of material contribution to risk set out in Hanke, it 
is nevertheless an improvement when compared to the traditional but-for 
approach.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR RISK-BASED REFORMS IN TOXIC CAUSATION
Commentators have suggested a range of risk-based innovations, in-
cluding the creation of a new tort of negligent creation of risk,84 the imposi-
tion of a reverse onus on proof of inadequate product testing,85 probabilistic
proportional recovery,86 and the recognition of a cause of action in battery 
when plaintiffs are exposed to harmful or poorly understood chemicals.87
The most likely starting point for the expansion of risk-based liability in 
Canada is through a resuscitation of the broad Hanke formulation of mate-
rial contribution to risk as an alternative to but-for causation.
82. Craig Jones, Reasoning Through Probabilistic Causation in Individual and Aggregate 
Claims: The Struggle Continues, 39 ADVOC. Q. 18, 28 (2011).
83. Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 44 (Can.).
84. See generally Gerecke, supra note 38.
85. Wagner, supra note 13, at 833–36.
86. PORAT & STEIN, supra note 47.
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A. The Case for a Broad Conception of Material Contribution to Risk
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Clements is the first ex-
plicit articulation of risk-based liability in the Canadian law of causation.
From this perspective, it can be seen as a significant step forward for toxic 
tort plaintiffs and environmental public policy. However, the decision 
clearly curtailed the broad innovation introduced in Hanke, while leaving 
the door open for future incremental reform in the indeterminate plaintiff 
scenario. The Supreme Court’s back-and-forth dance in Hanke and Clem-
ents suggests some discomfort or even confusion in the court’s approach to 
risk-based liability. From the perspective of tort law’s traditional goals of 
compensation and deterrence, it would seem clear that a broad form of 
liability for material contribution to risk would improve tort law’s ability to 
meet its objectives. More plaintiffs who are tortiously harmed by toxic 
wrongdoing would receive compensation, and the manufacturers and emit-
ters of toxic substances would have an increased incentive to exercise care 
in the investigation and dissemination of chemical products and pollution.
Some critics have expressed a “floodgates” concern, suggesting that a 
broad test of material contribution to risk would eliminate the gate-keeping 
function of the causation element.88 Justice Brown, for example, wrote that 
on the Hanke approach, “if causation is the only obstacle, it is no obstacle 
at all,” suggesting that the demonstration of risk at the causation stage 
would be redundant (and thus unnecessary) since the plaintiff already has 
to show unreasonable risk in order to establish a breach of the duty of 
care.89 While this proposition may hold true in some contexts, it does not 
apply to the toxic tort arena. The defendant who does not study its sub-
stance at all, for example, will undoubtedly be in breach of the duty of care, 
but will simultaneously make it impossible for the plaintiff to prove a mate-
rial contribution to risk since there will be a complete lack of data. The 
demonstration of material contribution to risk requires a substantial body of 
reliable data as well as expert opinion by relevant scientists.90 In some cas-
es, a rigorous data set may in fact demonstrate an absence of material risk. 
In other words, proof of generic causation under a broad conception of 
88. See Black & Cheifetz, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 66, at 249; The Honourable 
Russell Brown, Material Contribution’s Expanding Hegemony: Factual Causation After Hanke v. 
Resurfice Corp., 45 CAN. BUS. L.J. 432 (2007); Cheifetz & Black, Material Contribution and Quantum 
Uncertainty, supra note 66, at 155; Lawrie et al., supra note 66, at 378. 
89. BROWN, supra note 29, at 445.
90. See generally Cranor & Eastmond, supra note 28 (describing the massive investment in time, 
money, and scientific attention necessary to identify the risks posed by any given chemical substance); 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 78 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
07 COLLINS-FINAL REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:08 PM
2016] CONTRIBUTION TO RISK IN CANADIAN LAW 583
material contribution to risk would remain a formidable obstacle to recov-
ery.
In addition to data demonstrating generic causation, plaintiffs seeking 
to prove a material contribution to risk would also have to adduce evidence 
concerning the nature of their exposure to the defendant’s substance includ-
ing concentrations, duration, etc. Thus, in many cases the principled risk-
based test articulated in Hanke would defeat a claim for chemically induced 
damages; the gate-keeping function of causation remains intact under this 
approach.
Taking a broader, instrumentalist approach to tort doctrine,91 it seems 
clear that the expansion of risk-based liability in Canadian tort law would 
serve the public interest in environmental health protection. The post-
Clements, narrow version of risk-based liability privileges defendants who 
release substances that increase the risk to a population of people but lack 
sufficient data to ground a finding of but-for causation in any individual 
case. The Clements test only applies in the rare case where the substance-
illness connection is clear and the one remaining area of uncertainty is 
whose product or pollution harmed the plaintiff.
As explained above, with respect to many thousands of chemicals, 
there is inadequate data to prove causation of harm on a but-for test, even 
when it is clear that the defendant has exposed people to an unreasonable 
toxic risk. Defendants have the ability to test their substances, and profit 
from their production and dissemination; plaintiffs bear the risk of expo-
sure and illness. In this context, there is a compelling argument that as be-
tween a negligent defendant and an innocent plaintiff, the former should 
bear the burden of risk.92
B. Stronger Risk-based Reforms
Recognizing the profound vulnerability of individuals exposed to tox-
ic substances and the converse informational advantage enjoyed by toxic 
defendants, it seems just to reverse the burden of proof of causation, once a 
plaintiff has demonstrated material increase in risk or a negligent failure to 
investigate. Reversing the burden of proof on causation is perhaps the sin-
gle biggest contribution tort law could make to the generation of safety data 
91. See generally Jerry V. DeMarco, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Recognition of Fundamen-
tal Environmental Values: What Could Be Next in Canadian Environmental Law?, 17 J. ENVTL. L. &
PRAC. 159 (2007). 
92. Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact: Alternative 
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on chemical substances.93 Currently, the rules of causation reward those 
defendants who produce minimal data, thus precluding a finding of toxici-
ty. Even the broad test of material contribution to risk articulated in Hanke 
cannot be met if there is little or no safety data on the relevant substance.94
One way to avoid this perverse incentive is to impose liability for a failure 
to discover and disseminate adequate information concerning a given prod-
uct or substance, as proposed by Wendy Wagner and Margaret Berger.95
Such liability may be framed in battery96 or in negligence. In a negligence 
action, the plaintiff should be required to prove that the defendant did not 
conduct adequate investigations and/or disclose relevant information, at 
which point the burden of proof on causation should be reversed.97 This 
formulation reverses the incentive structure inherent in the traditional ap-
proach by penalizing the manufacture of ignorance and aligning defend-
ants’ commercial interests with the societal interest in constraining the 
release of hazardous or poorly understood chemical substances.
In the battery formulation, liability is imposed based on the defendant 
knowingly exposing a particular population or individual plaintiff to 
“harmful or offensive contact” through a toxic or poorly understood sub-
stance.98 Involuntary touching by a toxic substance clearly meets the defi-
nition of “harmful or offensive contact” and touching by a substance that is 
not well understood may be viewed as involuntary experimentation—a
recognized species of battery in Canada.99 Canadian torts jurisprudence has 
already recognized small-scale toxic battery actions. In one case the court 
imposed liability where striking workers introduced a chemical spray into 
the air system of a truck driven by a replacement worker.100 In another, the 
court held a landlord liable in “either negligence or battery” for knowingly 
supplying drinking water contaminated with arsenic to his tenants.101
Recognition of larger-scale pollution or provision of toxic products as 
forms of battery would vindicate the right of Canadian citizens to control 
their own bodies and would incentivize companies to choose safer products 
and minimize pollution.
93. Wagner, supra note 13, at 833.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Berger, supra note 18.
96. See generally Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 21.
97. Wagner, supra note 13, at 833–34.
98. See generally Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 21.
99. Id. at 134 et seq.
100. Swanson v. Mallow, [1991] 5 W.W.R. 454 (Can. Sask. Q.B.), aff’d, [1992] 2 W.W.R. 718
(Can. Sask. C.A.).
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Whether framed in negligence or battery, recovery for mere risk expo-
sure (i.e., without present injury) raises questions as to timing and quantifi-
cation of damages. Ariel Porat and Alex Stein argue that plaintiffs who are 
exposed to risk should be able to recover an amount proportional to the 
probability of their incurring the potential injury.102 They further suggest 
that plaintiffs should have the option of suing before or after the risk mate-
rializes; those who sue for risk alone would be foreclosed from returning to 
court if the illness ultimately does materialize.103 Probabilistic proportional 
recovery for risk alone would appear to be well beyond the conceptual 
grasp of current Canadian jurisprudence.
However, recovery in battery for involuntary chemical touchings is a 
recognized cause of action in Canada, and a reversal in burden of proof on 
causation in negligence actions was at least entertained by the Supreme 
Court of Canada and lower courts in previous decades.104 It is possible that 
given the right set of facts, the Court might be willing to revisit this pro-
posal.
V. CONCLUSION
There are moments in history when courts are faced with novel harms 
and must develop novel responses. In the decades following the industrial 
revolution, for example, society faced an unprecedented form of risk result-
ing from the new phenomenon of mass production. For the first time, con-
sumers could be exposed to risks created by manufacturers who were far 
away and socially unaccountable to a person injured by their products. 
Courts responded with a groundbreaking innovation in the duty of care 
element of negligence—the articulation of a principled approach that 
broadened duty beyond the confines of historically recognized catego-
ries.105 Less than a century later, courts in Canada and elsewhere are begin-
ning to recognize yet another unprecedented universe of risks resulting 
from the burgeoning production and dissemination of chemical products 
and pollution. Scholars and litigants are asking courts to rise to this chal-
lenge just as their predecessors did in response to industrialization.
The introduction of material contribution to risk as an alternative to 
but-for causation is a baby step in the evolution of Canadian toxic tort law. 
102. See generally PORAT & STEIN, supra note 47.
103. See, e.g., Porat & Stein, supra note 18, at 233–34; see also John M. Darley et al., Doing
Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010).
104. See, e.g., Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326–27 (Can.).
105. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916); Buckley v. Mott, [1919] 50 
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An expansion of risk-based liability through the broadening of material 
contribution (per Hanke), the imposition of a reverse onus on proof of in-
adequate testing, and the recognition of toxic battery would go further to-
wards protecting the health of Canadian people and ecosystems. Given the 
dearth of chemical safety data, and the profound vulnerability of exposed 
populations, calls for these and other risk-based reforms are likely to persist 
until they are answered.
